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It is hard to understand the significance of Attica or its legacy without considering the phenomenon of America’s “war on crime.” First, the Attica uprising was in many ways caused by the overcrowding in prisons that resulted from increasingly draconian “anti-crime” legislation that was introduced in 1964 by Lyndon Johnson and continued by Richard Nixon from 1969 into the 1970s. This happened even though, as Thompson notes, in 1964 “the nation’s crime rate was historically unremarkable” (19). For example, she cites the fact that the murder rate that year was only 5.1 per 100,000 as opposed to 8.1 in 1921 and 9.7 in 1933. Further, this war on crime influenced the brutal nature of the retaking. As Thompson points out, “Rockefeller made no bones about the fact that he too would be ‘tough on crime’” (19). He wanted to shake off his liberal reputation in the Republican party, and crushing the Attica uprising provided the perfect opportunity.
Events at Attica then helped accelerate the process of which it had been a symptom. This was especially true of the stories told about prisoner atrocities. As Thompson says, “While the lies told at Attica—how it had been spun— did not, in some linear way, cause mass incarceration, they had certainly fueled it” (564). As she notes, incarceration rates dramatically increased after Attica. State claims were, of course, proven false. Despite this, the images in the immediate aftermath, of castration and throat slitting, would have left an indelible mark on the nation’s psyche. This discourse would also have played into a narrative underscoring the entire process. This is the narrative of 1960s “permissiveness”—that “[a]ctivists and protestors […] had simply gone too far” (561). The clamor from some voters for politicians to be “tough on crime” then had little to do with any real increased risk of being a victim. Rather, it was a cultural and psychological phenomenon. It was a reaction to the social liberalization of the 1960s and a fear of what would happen for traditional culture if this went unchecked.
In this way, the legacy of Attica would be felt down the decades. The law-and-order ticket would continue with Ronald Reagan and the “war on drugs.” It would also help transform the Democratic party. After the landslide defeat of Michael Dukakis in 1988 to George Bush Senior, attributed to a perception that the former was “soft on crime,” Bill Clinton made sure he would not repeat the mistake. Thus followed Clinton’s election in 1992 on an aggressive “tough on crime” platform. With it came a raft of draconian new legislation. This included an additional $9.7 billion for the building of new prisons. All the while, the number of people arrested, and America’s prison population, skyrocketed.
Superintendent Mancusi, like Rockefeller, saw the uprising at Attica “as the work of black militant troublemakers” (17). That is, the rebellion was part of a broader black plot to overthrow “white” capitalist America, aided by White leftists. While no such plot existed, and the revolt occurred largely by chance, race still played a large role in what unfolded. Specifically, racism and racist anxieties played a role both in causing the uprising and in its bloody aftermath. Taking the former first, racism helped to aggravate tensions at the prison. As Thompson says, “So obvious was the racial discrimination at Attica that white prisoners readily agreed that guards applied rules differently to blacks and Puerto Ricans” (14). Non-White prisoners were more likely to be punished, and punished harder, by the exclusively White COs. They also got most of the worst jobs in the prison and were paid less for them. Further, they would often be subject to racial slurs and abuse.
However, if these issues contributed to the frustrations that sparked the uprising, they also influenced the state’s response to it. Namely, racist attitudes influenced how the prison would be retaken in two ways. First, although this was never stated, the lives of predominantly Black prisoners could be easily sacrificed. No one in the media or public would lose too much sleep about deaths amongst this group, nor would those higher up like President Nixon. Second, the idea that it was “black militants” behind the revolt made a violent retaking seem not only necessary but also morally justified. If the broader safety of White America, what Rockefeller referred to as “our free society” was at stake (194), then a strong message needed to be sent to militants, and Black Panthers, everywhere.
This racism would have deleterious consequences for the assault itself. Racist sentiment was doubtless present in many of the guards and troopers to begin with, and the implicitly racist logic of, and justification for, a violent retaking stoked and encouraged these attitudes. As Thompson says, on the part of the troops, “it wasn’t just any hatred—it was racial hatred” (185). This was evident in the assault. Black inmates were gunned down with abandon, and one prisoner who had surrendered was told he would “soon be dead because ‘we haven’t killed enough n******”’ (185). While not sufficient to explain all the barbarity post retaking, unrestrained racist aggression explains some of it. Likewise for the lies told afterwards. Again, the state had obvious motives other than racism to fabricate stories of atrocities, yet the details—the stuffing of genitals in the mouth, the fact that it was Frank Smith, a large black prisoner, who was accused—were evidently playing up to racist tropes about cannibalism and primitivism. This appeal to stereotypes also helps explain why such lies were, on the part of many in the media and public, so readily accepted.
In the Epilogue, Thompson tells the story of George Williams. On August 9, 2011, at Attica, Williams was severely assaulted by a sergeant and three COs. He ended up with a broken collarbone and two broken legs. In response, “Attica’s men didn’t riot or rebel within the prison” (569). Rather, they insisted that an investigation be conducted and that the culprits face charges. They sought justice through the legal system and succeeded in getting three of the COs to stand trial in 2015. However, helped by public backing from the FVOA, the men escaped with a light plea deal that did not involve prison. At news of this, “George Williams wept” (570). As Thompson says, “No matter how hard he had fought to get justice, it still took his breath away that those who had beat him so mercilessly received little more than a reprimand” (570).
Thompson emphasizes the positives in this story. For the first time in the history of New York State, a guard had stood trial for assaulting a prisoner. She stresses the “fight” shown by Williams in making this so. This story suggests, she says, that the legacy and spirit of the original Attica victims lives on. However, a more pessimistic lesson could just as well be drawn: that there are limits to what can be achieved by litigation. This is because, as “Big Black” Smith put it, “the law did not serve ‘everyone’s needs on the same level’” (323). The law is influenced by money and by power, as seen in the original Attica cases. Those who are poor or marginalized will always struggle to get justice. Conversely, those like Rockefeller, or COs, will always be favored. The state will almost never convict its own or go after those in power.
Litigation is limited in another way. While it might provide closure for individuals or certain symbolic victories, it does not in itself alter the social or economic structures that oppress people or create the need for legal redress in the first place. Indeed, it can have the opposite effect. Legal compensation in an unjust society, invested in seeing all inmates as dangerous criminals, may cause pressure to punish other prisoners even further. This is, in fact, what happened with Attica. That is, as Thompson acknowledges, the Attica cases “helped to fuel a historically unprecedented backlash against all efforts to humanize prison conditions in America” (561). Avoiding this outcome is not easy, yet doing so means at the very least struggling with more direct and broader levers for social change, with litigation secondary. These are potentially less glamorous but ultimately far more effective tools for change, such as protest movements, political parties, and electoral politics.
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