Culture and Anarchy: An Essay in Political and Social Criticism

Culture and Anarchy opens with a lengthy Preface that offers an overview of many of the important ideas that will dominate the work as a whole. Matthew Arnold describes the first aim of his Preface as “to address a word of exhortation to the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge” (76), lamenting the fact that they have neglected to print more recent editions of Bishop Thomas Wilson’s Maxims of Piety and Christianity (see: Key Figures), a work Arnold cites as an important inspiration for his own thought. Arnold argues that it is essential that the Society should publish classic religious works like Wilson’s to combat “the cartloads of rubbish circulated at present under this designation [of religious texts]” (78). Arnold praises the wisdom of Wilson in both the Maxims and in another work, Sacra Privata, crediting Wilson for his “honesty and good sense united with ardour and unction” (81). Arnold urges the Society to republish Wilson’s works, claiming they will exercise a good religious influence upon Englishmen.

Arnold then passes onto the more specific designs of Culture and Anarchy as a whole. He describes the main idea of the work, which is to argue that true culture is more essential than ever for society. Arnold offers a definition of culture as “a pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world” (82) and to apply that knowledge, in turn, to the critical examination of beliefs and values currently in effect. Arnold then admits that intellectuals and cultural believers are often accused of being useless pedants, but nevertheless one of the greatest determining factors of the “solidity” (83) of an Englishmen’s life is “whether he reads during that day, and, far more still [. . .] what he reads during it” (83).

Arnold claims that English culture is often too resistant toward embracing the pursuit of true culture, as many English subjects and commentators tend to be mistrustful of critically examining their notions and beliefs and can be quite defensive when challenged. He offers some examples, such as his attempted critiques of current school regimes and some of the tensions between Nonconformists and the Anglican religious establishment of the Church of England (see: Contextual Analysis). Arnold argues that much of the resistance toward true culture is based on a misunderstanding: “[I]t is not culture’s work or aim to give victory to some rival fetish, but simply to turn a free and fresh stream of thought upon the whole matter in question” (90). Arnold also adds that true culture works toward perfection on both an individual level as well as a more general, societal one.

Significantly, Arnold professes his firm belief that it is “Establishments” (95), and not Nonconformist sects of any kind, that have tended to produce “great works” (95) in both the humanities and the sciences. Arnold criticizes the “provincialism of the English Puritans and Nonconformists” (97), contrasting them unfavorably with the importance of “Establishment” European thinkers. Arnold also touches upon a key concept that will be more fully developed in later chapters of Culture and Anarchy: the contrast between “Hebraism,” the Judaic/Semitic influence in modern Christian culture, and “Hellenism,” the influence of classical Greece and Rome. Arnold makes some remarks about the commonalities of English religious provincialism and American Protestantism, believing both to be frequently too literal and narrow in their religious doctrines and practices.

Arnold asserts that America’s provincialism has left it with little influence upon wider Western culture. He also mentions three social categories in England—"Barbarians” (aristocrats), “Philistines” (the middle class), and the “Populace” (the working class)—which will form the topic of one of his later chapters. Crucially, Arnold claims that the “provincialism” of Victorian English society and American society hinder the creation and spread of true culture due to a set of values that are “calculated to produce miners, or engineers, or architects, not sweetness and light” (113). “Sweetness and light” are, for Arnold, the essence of true culture: a harmonious unity between beauty (“sweetness”) and reason or intelligence (“light”). He believes that English Victorian society, ruled by its obsession with manufacturing, trade, and profits, has left no room for “sweetness and light” to thrive. Arnold then once again returns to religious matters, elucidating further his ideas as to why the narrowness of Nonconformism stymies its development and causes dissension. Arnold argues that true culture can help resolve interdenominational religious squabbles through its commitment to harmony and right reason.

Toward the end of his Preface, Arnold touches upon one of his key arguments: “Now, and for us [the English] it is a time to Hellenise, and to practice knowing; for we have Hebraised too much, and have overvalued doing” (142, emphasis added). Arnold believes that English society, with its emphasis on industry, productivity, and even radical political reforms, has neglected the importance of developing reason, open-mindedness, flexibility, and a greater appreciation for beauty and perfection—the English have adhered too closely to the influence of Hebraism and neglected Hellenism to their cultural detriment.