Democracy in America

Tocqueville’s last major theme is the rarity of revolutions and democracy’s effect on military norms and culture. Tocqueville argues that while revolution often produces democracies, these times of social flux are unlikely to be a permanent feature. Social equality, by improving quality of life for more citizens, creates more disinterest in revolution, especially among “these eager and anxious small proprietors” who have only recently gained property (608). Society in democracy is not static: “They vary, alter, or renovate secondary things every day; they take great care not to touch the principal ones” (610). In essence, Tocqueville argues that Americans are cautious about altering large structures though they frequently change their personal ones.

Only a small minority of outsiders can bring about a revolution in a democratic society. Tocqueville argues that the growing social equality eventually produces broad intellectual consensus, what he calls “common opinions” (612). Americans are also preoccupied with everyday life and are not easily carried away by radical intellectuals with new ideas. This tendency to think with the majority also operates on an emotional level, as any individual tempted to deviate too far from this consensus finds that “their sense of isolation and their impotence immediately overwhelms them and drives them to despair” (615). This brings Tocqueville back to his anxieties about majority opinion expressed in Volume 1: Tocqueville argues that consensus is so strong it can be truly destructive to those who offer innovation. He continues on this theme as he asserts, “I cannot prevent myself from fearing that men will arrive at the point of looking on every new theory as a peril, every innovation as a distressing trouble” (616). This will result in a situation where “humanity will no longer advance” (617). While he acknowledges that democracy results in some economic, material, and social progress, Tocqueville’s overall view is more measured and anxious. He acknowledges that democracy may have some specific advantages in the present but remains concerned that its excesses may be ultimately become harmful to human advancement and freedom.

Tocqueville argues that distaste for war grows in democracies, similar to the distaste for revolutions. These sentiments are not true for their armies, however, as soldiers want war to advance their ambitions—there is no automatic “officer class” as in an aristocratic system. Because democracies are generally prosperous and do not esteem military careers or require them, armies take their numbers from the lower classes and become what Tocqueville calls “an uncivilized little nation” (621). Armies may be more desirous of revolution than the population as a whole, and the only possible cure for this is war. But care must be taken that the army does not grow too large, as this only increases the number of men who seek elevated positions in the world that cannot easily be satisfied. The key solution is to ensure that all citizens embrace democratic norms so that these values also reach the army: “Have enlightened, regulated, steadfast, and free citizens, and you will have disciplined and obedient soldiers” (622).

Tocqueville argues that democracies will find themselves dependent on mandatory service, which means that enlisted soldiers will retain civilian values, as they seek to return to civilian life once their service ends. Officers have their own concerns and do not retain ties to civilian life; they absorb military values but are cautious about seeking revolution or more war because they do not want to lose the advances they have already made. This is in contrast to the younger, noncommissioned officer, who

wants it always and at any price, and if he is refused war, he desires revolutions that suspend the authority of rules in the midst of which he hopes, thanks to the confusion and to political passions, to chase his officer out and take his place (625).

Tocqueville claims these patterns are universal. He argues, “In every democratic army it will always be the noncommissioned officer who least represents the peaceable and regular spirit of the country and the soldier who best represents it” (625). Thus, the closer soldiers are to everyday life in a democracy, the more they will preserve it upon return home and prevent revolution.

Democratic armies will begin wars at a disadvantage, as rank-and-file soldiers will be young and senior officers older and cautious. But long wars are suited to democracies, as “war becomes the great and sole industry” and younger talent enters the officer class (628). Democratic citizens eventually become enthralled with the possibility of glory. Tocqueville ultimately argues that military careers become appealing as a way to avoid the long drudgery of social advancement in industrial democratic life.

Where aristocratic armies depend on obedience from their social structures—such as a peasant obeying a lord—democratic armies must appeal to the reason of their members to achieve compliance. Tocqueville argues that this can be successful, drawing on Greek and Roman history for his examples.

To conclude his discussion of the military in democracies, Tocqueville argues that international conflict becomes less frequent as more countries embrace democracy. Further, victory now depends on the size of armies rather than skill, because in democracies, “when all men are alike, they are all weak” (632). Democracies are also easily conquered, as all their force lies in state apparatus rather than in the political will of small groups of aristocrats who can mount resistance through guerrilla campaigns. Tocqueville writes that aristocrats are also more likely to continue fighting for reasons of power:

In a nation where equality of conditions reigns, each citizen, on the contrary, has only a small part in political power and often takes no part in it; on the other hand, all are independent and have goods to lose, so that they fear conquest much less and war much more than an aristocratic people (634).

This, for Tocqueville, explains why Napoleon was successful: He understood that victory required conquering capital cities. Tocqueville argues that civil wars in democracies will be rare, as majority pressure is so strong. When they do occur because the army takes up one cause, they will be brief, as the rebellious army will either be co-opted by the state or crushed by it. Tocqueville once more falls back on economic conditions to explain distinctions between aristocracy and democracy; the preference for material well-being above all else explains why wars are deeply dreaded. His claim that civil wars would be brief when they occurred does not match American experience in the decades after his writing, but this conclusion is consistent with his belief that threats to the United States and the federal system would be resolved peacefully.