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Research has found that people who do “dirty” jobs tend to have a positive view of their professions. It is not that they love what they do, but that they dislike their jobs much less than the people with supposedly “good” jobs. The key for most workers is not what they do but what it means to them and how they relate and compare themselves to others. Like many other aspects of live, “[o]ur relationship with our work […] is relative” (178). This relationship was first discovered by sociologist Samuel Stouffer, who found that, paradoxically, soldiers were the most satisfied when working in areas where they had the least opportunity for promotion. In areas with flat hierarchies with little chance for promotion, soldiers were happiest, while hierarchical areas bred resentment between soldiers. This led Stouffer to a theory of relative deprivation, which asserts that relative standing in a hierarchy matters as much, or more, than the tangible rewards associated with rank. Because the workplace is where most people directly experience inequality on a daily basis, equality and inequality in pay, status, and power shapes the meaning we assign to work.
Workplaces are organized in hierarchies, as is just about everything humans do as a group. Even in social situations or workplaces without formal hierarchies, there are still observable differences in status, influence, and pay. Hierarchies pose a number of advantages for the workplace: promotions serve as incentives to work harder, and hierarchies provide clear rules about roles and expectations and enable people to specialize in areas where they are most skilled. But workplace hierarchies can be organized well or poorly, and they are increasingly structured poorly.
Most people assume that those in leadership or executive roles have the most stressful jobs, compared to regular office workers, but in truth it is actually the opposite. One of the reasons hierarchy is so stressful for those at the bottom is that they lack control over how and when they do their work. Ordinarily, increased control goes alongside higher rank and pay, but the way pay inequality affects productivity and job satisfaction is complex. In theory, pay inequality should be motivational, but in reality it often creates resentment. Managers seem to realize this, as most companies have either formal policies or informal norms that keep individual pay secret. A study of University of California professors who learned about their colleagues’ pay found that high pay inequality reduced the satisfaction of those at the bottom without increasing the satisfaction of those at the top.
Another question is whether pay inequality can motivate performance. In a study of the MLB and NFL, researchers found that the teams with the greatest pay inequality won fewer games, and that pay inequality can create resentment, erode cooperation, and weaken teamwork. Superstar players on high-inequality teams were found to perform worse than superstars on low-inequality teams, which is the opposite of what we would expect if pay inequality did motivate performance. However, pay inequality does not always undercut performance; in individual sports such as golf or car racing, inequality in prize money did lead to better performance. But in team sports, “the harmful effects of inequality on morale and teamwork outweighed the positive effects on performance” (187).
To understand the effects of pay inequality, we must consider whether the workplace is more like a team sport or an individual sport. The vast majority of workplaces in the modern economy require a high degree of teamwork and cooperation. Employees do not want full equality; they understand that someone with advanced training, skills, and experience should make more than a novice. But they do desire a fair balance between their contributions and their rewards. When people feel that they are not appropriately compensated for their work, their response can take many forms, such as negotiating for higher pay or engaging bad behavior like slacking off, stealing, or sabotage. Research has identified “a sense of injustice and a lack of control” (191) as common motivators for bad behavior at work. In short, when workers experience loss of control, they become stressed, and when they feel they are treated unfairly, they get even.
Because people judge their rewards through comparisons to others, the stagnant wages of ordinary workers combined with ever-rising executive pay poses a massive problem for the future. Studies have shown that people’s ideal level of inequality was less than their estimate of actual inequality, and these estimates were far less than the level of actual inequality. Respondents, regardless of age, education, political orientation, or wealth, thought that in an ideal world the average CEO should make about 4.6 times as much as the average worker; they then estimated that the average CEO makes about 10 times as much. In reality, the average US CEO earns about 350 times as much as their average worker. It is doubtful that a CEO is worth 350 times as much as a regular employee, as studies have attributed the impact of an individual CEO’s skill on a company’s performance at between 5% and 22% (194).
This extreme inequality between executive and worker pay is likely to undermine job satisfaction, team performance, and product quality. It is also likely to inspire workers to slack off, steal, and sabotage, further eroding company performance. The only thing that has kept these tendencies in check so far is people’s ignorance of just how unequal things are.
Payne asserts that “[t]he live fast, die young approach that is motivated by an uncertain future leads to shortsighted decisions […] that provide short-term rewards but sabotage the future” (197). Similarly, our stress systems’ emergency response to daily crises helps us in the short term but sabotages our future health. Finally, the insecurity fueled by poverty combined with the polarized social divisions stoked by inequality “provoke us to embrace simplistic beliefs, extreme ideologies, and prejudices that […] sabotage the healthy functioning of civil society” (197). In turn, each of these factors worsens the initial inequality and insecurity, leading to a vicious cycle.
Those “who can afford to move away from troubled areas tend to do so, leaving behind them those with the worst problems and least prospects” (197), making it harder for the disadvantaged to escape poverty. Those who do escape need to achieve an “escape velocity,” and once they do, they think and act differently from those who could not escape. And as the educated and wealthy pull further away from everyone else, these disparities become enshrined in impenetrable cultural barriers because “living in such different lives in such dissimilar places means that we share few assumptions about how the world works” (198). Understanding how inequality accelerates these cycles of disadvantage helps us defuse the conflicts that arise when we discuss inequality.
When people debate whether individual choices or systemic factors cause inequality, they are missing the point. It is not “an either-or debate;” rather, “inequality affects our behavior, and differences in behavior can magnify inequality” (200). This “self-reinforcing cycle between poverty and self-defeating behavior” (200) is often ignored when it comes to “proposing solutions” to poverty. Payne writes, “Conservatives focus on individual agency and argue that we have to develop incentives to motivate the poor” (200) to improve themselves. However, the poor are driven by immediate problems involving “daily crises, which they attempt to cope with using the best short-term crisis management responses they have available” (200). Those on the left “recognize the importance of systemic factors like inequality and inherited disadvantage,” but they “minimize the important role that individuals’ decisions play in their fate” (200). Finally, many who see the poor’s persistent harmful behavior conclude that nothing that can be done. However, this ignores that people’s behaviors are a response to their environments, and that these environments can be changed because the same forces that cause “vicious cycles” in the poor cause “virtuous cycles” in the rich.
The role inequality plays in health, decision-making, and socio-political divisions means that economic growth alone cannot solve these problems: “Just as people often confuse inequality with poverty, they often confuse the goal of reducing inequality with the goal of fostering economic growth” (203). This is because above a certain point (around $75,000 per year), making more money stops making us any happier because we quickly adapt to our new economic status. This is known as the Easterlin paradox, a finding in which “average happiness is entirely unrelated to economic growth over time” (203). By standard growth metrics, the last 50 years have been great for America, with even the financial crisis of 2008 only representing a small dip. If economic growth was all that mattered, Americans would be extremely happy, but they have never been more dissatisfied. The key to understanding this paradox is the fact that economic “growth has not been widely shared” because “almost all of it has gone to the richest few percent” (205).
Payne acknowledges that economic growth is better than economic stagnation, but when that growth solely benefits the rich, this will magnify inequality and make everyone less happy. To tackle this, we must pursue two solutions simultaneously: building a flatter ladder while also getting better at living amid its rungs. Shortening and flattening the ladder (i.e., reducing inequality) is the most immediate and powerful way to address the health and social problems caused by inequality because it tackles them simultaneously at the root rather than in the piecemeal way policymakers normally approach them. The only way to achieve this is by “moving away from seeing inequality through a moralizing lens” and instead naming it a “public health problem” (206). In practice, this “means both raising the bottom rungs of the social ladder and lowering the top ones” (206) using solutions that involve both markets and governments. This is not a call for socialism “any more than efforts to reduce binge drinking are a demand for prohibition or a call to reduce the speed limit is an effort to slow traffic to a crawl” (208). Eliminating all inequality is not the objective; rather, Payne recommends adjusting “the level of inequality to a more human scale” (208). Some level of inequality is natural and healthy, but extreme inequality is not.
Shortening and flattening the ladder is a long-term project, but other strategies can improve the quality of individual lives in the near term (206). The first is recognizing when we are making unconscious comparisons and instead choosing our social comparisons wisely and consciously. The second strategy is redirecting these comparisons with others to our own past to more accurately gauge our status. The final strategy is changing the contexts within which we compare by moving from high-poverty areas to low-poverty areas or, if that is not feasible, moving from high-inequality areas to low-inequality ones.
The above strategies are mostly aimed at the poor and middle class, but the rich should also strive to reduce inequality because high inequality leads to increased crime, illness, and political polarization, which degrade quality of life across social classes. But even more directly for the rich, “higher levels of inequality tend to accelerate the social comparison treadmill, in which you have to run faster to stay in place” (183). High inequality has also been observed to lead the rich to act more entitled and less virtuously. The rich must be conscious that their success is a mix of ability, effort, and chance, and realize that they are in a privileged position to make a difference.
The final strategy applies to everyone and concerns assessing what is most important and meaningful to you as an individual. When people perform this exercise, they almost never write down status. Furthermore, simply focusing on this question makes people less likely to care about others’ perceptions, less impulsive, and more likely to close the achievement gap. This exercise only requires shifting our perspective from the standard economic model, where people respond rationally to incentives, to a more realistic psychological one, where people habitually compare their positions to their social contexts to gauge their worth. Payne concludes, “Making the conscious effort to consider what genuinely matters interrupts the unconscious default pattern of looking to others to gauge how much we value ourselves” (219).
In the final section Payne ties together the book’s various arguments by focusing on where most experience inequality on a daily basis (our workplace) and by making recommendations for the future. Payne specifically withheld discussing the workplace until the penultimate chapter because it allows readers to connect insights from previous chapters to their own lived experience to understand how inequality shapes our daily lives. Payne also uses this chapter to engage with broader debates, particularly in economics and politics, about the social function of inequality. In previous chapters, Payne argued against the notion that present-day inequality is a natural occurrence by asserting that although some inequality will always be natural, our current level of massive inequality is not and causes many social problems. Here, Payne deals with a similar question of major importance: Is inequality a crucial motivating factor for individual performance? Put another way, do the motivational effects of inequality on our job performance outweigh the negative effects of inequality as discussed throughout the book? Payne says no, drawing on statistical data on job performance and interviews with workers who engage in workplace resistance by slacking off, stealing, or committing sabotage. He argues that while inequality can motivate performance in highly individualized and competitive environments, such as professional golf, it undermines performance in team environments. And because nearly all of us work in collaborative workplaces, where inequality undermines both job performance and satisfaction, the negative effects of massive inequality far outweigh any positive effects.
Payne also uses this section to summarize the previous chapters and suggest some future directions. Broadly speaking, in each specific chapter Payne argues that inequality leads to negative outcomes, and these negative outcomes in turn worsen inequality. This has led to a vicious cycle that has led to our current environment. But Payne still sees a glimmer of hope here: Because inequality is what matters, and because inequality is environmental in nature, we can change our environment to improve outcomes, which will lead to a virtuous cycle. In other words, if we can reduce inequality, we can generate positive outcomes (e.g., better health, less implicit racial bias, greater job satisfaction), which will in turn further reduce inequality. However, we must be careful about how we reduce inequality. It is inequality that matters, not poverty—economic growth is not enough to solve inequality and could actually worsen it if that growth is not equally shared.
Payne makes two broad suggestions for reducing the negative effects of inequality, one political-economic and one psychological. Governments must use the tools available to them to reduce inequality over the long term, to shorten and flatten the Status Ladder. Payne carefully presents these policy suggestions in a technocratic and apolitical fashion. He is not arguing for one party or the other, and he explicitly states he is not advocating for socialism. Rather, Payne argues that reducing inequality is better for everyone, even the rich, and so the wealthiest individuals and corporations also have a vested interest in reducing inequality before the situation worsens. Payne is essentially making a liberal-utilitarian argument: The current status quo is not working, and so we must use human reason to fix it, thereby increasing the entire country’s total happiness, health, and productivity.
Payne’s second suggestion involves how individuals can better live within the rungs of the Status Ladder over the short term. He recommends everyone be more conscious about their thinking, the comparisons they unconsciously make, and how they got where they are. This recommendation sits within the broad cognitive-behavioral approach popularized over the last decade. By transforming our constant subjective, unconscious status comparisons into objective, conscious thinking, we can better recognize and challenge unhelpful thought patterns. Doing so will allow us to live happier lives within the rungs while policymakers engage in the long-term process of shortening and flattening the ladder.
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