The World of Yesterday: An Autobiography

Zweig begins his memoir with the idea that his childhood, and more broadly Austria in the 19th century, can be characterized as the “age of security” (23). At that point, the Habsburg Empire had lasted for almost 1,000 years, and the empire was so well established that “the state itself was the ultimate guarantor of durability” (23). For Europeans living at the turn of the 20th century, the very fact that the Austro-Hungarian state had endured for so long seemed to assure its continued endurance.

By the time Zweig penned his memoir, he understood how flawed that thinking was, and part of his project in this text is to explain to his readers how Europeans were so duped by the “false promise” of this security that they failed to see the looming threat of two world wars. Part of the widespread belief in the illusion of sociopolitical and economic security had its roots in the very ethos of the 19th century. Zweig writes: “In its liberal idealism, the 19th century was honestly convinced that it was on the direct and infallible path toward the best of all possible worlds” (24). The mid- to late 19th century saw the birth of the idea of equality, an interest in the rights of workers and women, and the dawn of an industrial revolution that would usher in an era of unprecedented advancement. Although the Austro-Hungarian Empire in many ways looked back to old traditions, there was a palpable aura of progress in Europe, especially during the latter half of the 19th century.

In addition to the spirit of idealism that lulled Europeans into a false sense of security, Zweig identifies a lack of precedent for conflict on the scale of World War I and World War II. The Habsburg Empire had stood for centuries, as had many of the other “great” powers in Europe at that time, and their stability was taken for granted. Zweig does argue that World War I should have taught Europe a lesson about security and precarity, but he recalls that in Vienna, even as Hitler rose to prominence in neighboring Germany, wealthy members of the Jewish bourgeoisie still went about their lives as normal, attending operas and orchestras in fancy dress, “never guessing that they would soon be wearing the convict garb of the concentration camp” (429).

It is in part because of the strength of this belief of security that the wars hit Europe as hard as they did. Zweig writes again and again about the pervasive refusal to acknowledge the threat posed by expansionist foreign policy, extremist ideology, and nationalism. In narrating the events of his life through the lens of this false promise Zweig hopes to help present and future generations learn from the mistakes of the past.

The rise of extremist ideologies is another key theme of Zweig’s memoir, and he includes in his analysis both left- and right-wing extremism. Nationalism is the overarching menace in the Europe of Zweig’s youth, but he also indicts the fascism of Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany as well as the bolshevism that swept Russia and eastern Europe during the early decades of the 20th century.

Part of Zweig’s mistrust of nationalism is rooted in his cosmopolitanism. As a “citizen of the world” (251), he was particularly against the fracturing of the pan-European identification he saw as so central to intellectualism, growth, and unity on the continent. As the member of an empire comprising multiple nations and ethnic groups that, in Zweig’s estimation was largely functional and free of prejudice, he also would have been dubious of an ideology that rested on an isolationist position. Nationalism did fracture Europe, and although he did not live to see the creation of the European Union and the resuscitation of a dream of pan-European identification, there is a way in which the early nationalisms of the 20th century irrevocably altered the Europe that Zweig knew and loved.

He also identified the threat that fascism posed to Europe, in Italy and in Germany. An ideology rooted in anti-democratic values, repression, prejudice, and hatred, fascism represented the greatest threat to the liberal, humanistic values of democratic societies. Nazism, although initially characterized by Hitler as a domestically focused ideology, of course became the greatest threat to European sovereignty that the continent had ever known, and Zweig was horrified to see that the end goal of National Socialism was the Europe-wide creation of a racially homogenous ethno-state.

Zweig saw danger on the left, too. He repeatedly identifies bolshevism as a threat and although he initially admires the Russian Revolution’s seeming dedication to equality, he ultimately perceives it as a threat and remarks after the war that he was happy that Austria had avoided the communist fate of Russia and other states. As moved as he is by the spirit of progress he finds when he visits Soviet Russia, he is also aware of the surveillance state and understands that what he sees on the surface does not necessarily represent the way that society actually functions.

Overall, there is a sense in Zweig’s memoir that extremist ideologies represented the greatest threat to Europe that it had ever known, and that they were the root causes of the wars that fractured Europe, forever altering the continent that he had known as a young man.