World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History

The subject of balance of power is a central theme of Kissinger’s World Order as the title suggests. The author acknowledges from the onset that what constitutes a world order is a complex question and that no perfect order exists. Kissinger seeks objectivity by examining the different types of regional orders and grounds them in the history and geography of each continent. His goal is to arrive at an optimal global order despite all the drawbacks.

One way to help the establishment of such an order is to use political realism, focus on one’s respective national interests, and suspend moralizing when it comes to competing value systems for the sake of a consensus. Another way is to use international organizations like the United Nations Security Council, UNSC, to arrive at compromises when it comes to contested issues. Another way yet is to focus on procedure rather than substance independent of a particular country’s ideology or form of leadership. All these aspects are typically associated with the Westphalian order. The Peace of Westphalia, Kissinger argues, was revolutionary. Designed to end the devastating Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), this series of agreements redefined international relations in Europe by focusing on the state as the basic unit of power and by prioritizing procedures. The current global order is still rooted in the Westphalian system despite its imperfections. Kissinger readily admits that this arrangement failed to prevent wars and violent revolutions.

There are other issues with establishing an equitable global order. First, the current international order is still rooted in a system designed by Europeans and, in some cases, imposed on the rest of the world through the colonial framework. Many other countries, whether small or rising giants like China, did not participate in defining this order. Kissinger argues the fact that as China’s impact continues to grow, and as that country becomes more assertive in the international arena, one day, it too, will redefine the global rules.

Another challenge to establishing healthy international relations is the fact that, at present, the United States remains the sole hegemon. At times, the United States uses economic pressure, such as sanctions, and direct political pressure, through hundreds of military bases around the world, to impose its will and achieve its goals. Kissinger does not fully expand on the hegemonic American position which he seems to take for granted. The author advocates for using a traditional form of European relations which he calls “the Westphalian model for a multipolar order of sovereign states” (204). Perhaps, it is possible to apply the traditional European multipolar model to the rest of the world. In this model, multiple centers of power on every continent would allow for more inclusive international participation.

The competition between different value systems around the world is also relevant. The purpose of Kissinger’s region-focused chapters is to highlight the existence of these differences. For example, when discussing post-1979 Iran, the author argues that Iran’s religious leadership perceives the state as a mere vehicle for achieving religious goals. This perception is quite different from that of the Europeans and Americans. Even the question of human rights is complicated by regional factors when the American definition clashes with local religious and cultural differences in non-Western regions. It is for this reason that Kissinger prefers a foreign policy that is devoid of imposing one’s culturally specific morals onto others—a policy that is focused on practical national interests instead.   

Finally, Kissinger highlights a new global challenge of non-state actors: militant and religious extremists such as the al-Qaeda terrorist group. Kissinger highlights their role in the American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as Syria. Their place outside the current order, loose organization structure, and dedication to achieving their goals make it difficult to deal with them by any means other than direct military intervention.

In general, Kissinger is not an idealist but rather a realist. He argues for a more inclusive world order, but, at the same time, emphasizes the necessity of international leadership of the so-called great powers. According to Kissinger, the current great powers in the world are the United States, the European Union, China, Japan, India, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. This emphasis is linked to his idea of balancing power and legitimacy—domestic and international.